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Case No. 20090359-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
Amador Santonio, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004); disarming a peace 
officer, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.8 (West 2004); 
assault on a peace officer, a classA misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-102.4 (West 2004); and interfering with legal arrest, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-8-305 (West 2004). R. 2123-24/9; 2855-56/12.l This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) (West 2009). 
Because the appellate record contains thirteen pleadings volumes, the State 
cites to the documents therein by both page and volume: R. page/volume. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES2 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S ARGUMENTS: 
1. Was Defendant's notice of appeal timely filed absent the completed 
"notarized statement or written declaration" required by rule 4(g), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue. 
2. Did Defendant's continued dilatory conduct in the face of express 
warnings and an explicit colloquy by the trial court constitute an implied waiver of 
his right to counsel? 
Standard of Review. "'Whether [Defendant] voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waived his right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. While 
we review questions of law for correctness, a trial court's factual findings may be 
reversed on appeal only if they are clearly erroneous.'" State v. Houston, 2006 UT 
App 437,14,147 F.3d 543 (quoting State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, f 23,137 P.3d 716); 
see also State v. Cabrera, 2007 UT App 194, | 7,163 P.3d 707. 
3. A. Were the summary contempt proceedings justified under these facts? 
2
 By order of June 23, 2010, this Court denied Defendant's motion to file an 
over-length brief and permitted counsel to include Defendant's pro se arguments in 
an addendum to the opening brief. Defendant's arguments are included in 
Appendix D of his brief. 
2 
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3. B. Did Judge Laycock properly affirm the contempt order? 
Standard of Review. We review a trial court's exercise of its contempt power 
for an abuse of discretion. See Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238,240 (Utah 
1976); see also Dansie v. Dansie, 1999 UT App 92, f 6,977 P.2d 539 ("An order relating 
to contempt of court is a matter that rests within the sound discretion of the trial 
court."). Reversal of a contempt decision is rare and will not occur absent trial court 
action '"which is so unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a 
clear abuse of... discretion [.]'" Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, | 39,100 P.3d 1151 
(quoting Dansie, 1999 UT App 92, | 6) (internal quotations omitted in Shipman). 
4. Did Judge Laycock properly order re-evaluation of Defendant's mental 
condition to fociis on its impact on his ability to form the requisite criminal intent? 
Standard of Review. "[TJhe determination whether to order a psychological 
examination rests largely within the discretion of the trial judge and will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, 
1f22,55 P.3d 573. 
5. Should this Court review Defendant's claimed Brady violation absent any 
attempt to establish the exculpatory nature of the subject evidence? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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6. Should Defendant's challenge to the exclusion from trial of defense exhibits 
2 and 8 fail due to inadequate briefing? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue. 
DEFENDANT'S PRO SE ARGUMENTS: 
7. Should Defendant's challenge to the exclusion from trial of defense exhibits 
28 and 29 fail due to inadequate briefing? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue. 
8. Does the invited error doctrine prevent review of Defendant's claim of 
error in the absence of an "attempt" instruction below? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this issue where 
Defendant invited the error below. • 
9. Has Defendant adequately briefed his challenge to the lower court's denial 
of his motion to arrest judgment? 
Standard of Review.. No standard of review applies to this issue. 
10. Has Defendant established any basis for application of the cumulative 
error doctrine? 
Standard of Review. "'A reviewing court will reverse a jury verdict under the 
cumulative error doctrine only if the cumulative effect of the several errors 
undermines . . . confidence that a fair trial was had/" State v. Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
139,220 P.3d 136 (quoting State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, | 56,191 P.3d 17 (omission 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted in Gallegos)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 4(g), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, is determinative of this appeal 
and is included herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE3 
The Beginning: 6/23/03 
On June 23,2003, Defendant was charged with attempted aggravated murder, 
a first degree felony; disarming a peace officer, a first degree felony; use of a 
dangerous weapon in a fight, a class A misdemeanor; assault against a police officer, 
a class A misdemeanor; and interfering with a legal arrest, a class B misdemeanor. 
See R. 1-2/1. More than four years and eight volumes of pleadings later, on August 
30, 2007, a preliminary hearing was held, and Defendant was bound over on an 
amended information that changed the attempted aggravated murder charge to 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, and left the remaining charges untouched. 
•R. 2121-24/9. • 
The State includes only an overview of the lengthy procedural history of this 
case. For additional information, the State refers the Court to Judge Davis7 
summary of the procedural history of the first three years of the case, which covers 
eighteen single-spaced pages. R. 1539-56/6. 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Delays began almost immediately. The court initially appointed defense 
counsel, counsel withdrew within days, and the court directed Defendant to obtain 
private counsel. R. 6-8/1; 11-14/1; 16/1. Defendant then actively began to 
represent himself, filing the first wave of documents that would be filed countless 
times in various forms over most of the next six years, including his first motion to 
recuse Judge Fred D. Howard, his first request for access to adequate legal materials, 
and his first complaints about lack of confidentiality in his contact with prospective 
counsel. R. 20/1; 42/1; 47-54/1; 61-62/1; 186-221/1; 1555-56/6. 
The First Competency Petition: 9/23/03-2/25/04 
Three months into the case, the State discovered that a federal judge had 
previously found Defendant incompetent to proceed and filed a petition seeking 
inquiry into Defendant's competency. R. 105/1; 109-17/1; 342/2; 763/3; 1555/6. 
Judge Howard recused himself, citing a federal lawsuit Defendant filed against him, 
and the matter was reassigned to Judge Schofield.4 R. 133/1; 1554-55/6. Judge 
Schof ield granted the petition, ultimately ordering preparation of three evaluations. 
R. 270-74/1; 277-80/1; 300-01/1) 306/1;335-36/2;352-56/2; 1553-54/6. Defendant's 
counsel, appointed for the competency proceedings, withdrew when the second 
4
 Over the course of the case, Defendant filed numerous federal cases, naming 
many, if not all, of the Fourth District Court Judges. R. 1558/ 6; R. 2963:8; R. 2973:16. 
6 
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evaluation was ordered. R. 223/1; 300-01/1. Five months after the petition was 
filed, and despite Defendant's opposition to every interim ruling, the judge 
determined that Defendant was competent to proceed. R. 361/2; 363-64/2. A 
subsequent rotation of the judges left the case with Judge Lynn W. Davis. R. 516/2. 
Proceedings and Delays: 7/14/04 - 9/8/05 
Over the course of the following year, Defendant buried the court in pro se 
paperwork, including the filing of: 
—a challenge to Judge Schofield's competency ruling; 
—multiple motions seeking contact attorney visits and confidentiality in 
his mail and in his meetings and phone calls with prospective counsel; 
—motions for access to legal materials; 
—motions for discovery and change of venue; 
—eight petitions for interlocutory review of various orders; and 
—five motions seeking to recuse the judge. 
R. 534/2-1148/4. 
In addition to considering responses and arguments on the above matters, the 
court gave Defendant 25 phone calls from jail to help him retain counsel. R. 654-
55/3. Thereafter, the State requested a colloquy with Defendant concerning self-
representation and his right to counsel. R. 678-84/3. Judge Davis began a colloquy, 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
then granted Defendant an additional 25 phone calls and library access with which 
to find counsel. R. 897/4; 1059-624. The court set a date for Defendant to appear 
with counsel, but he refused to go to court, and was found to have impliedly waived 
the right to counsel. R. 1061/4; 1544-45/6. On the State's motion, the district court 
judge appointed a public defender for the preliminary hearing. R. 1059/4; 1061/4; 
1544-45/6; R. 2964:24-25. The public defender objected and, after argument, the 
court permitted counsel to withdraw and continued the preliminary hearing. R. 
1059/4; 1063-68/4; 1069-71/4; 1078-86/4; 1091/4; 1104-17/4; 1128/4. 
The Second Competency Petition, Contempt and Waiver of Counsel: 
9/8/05 - 2/2/07 
Two years into the proceedings — on September 8, 2005 — the State sought a 
second competency hearing, arguing that Defendant " suffer[ed] from a mental 
disorder resulting in his inability to consult with counsel and to participate in the 
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding/' R. 
1137-38/4; 1209-10/4 (amended petition). Defendant immediately sought an 
extension to respond to the petition and to find counsel. R. 1148/4. Judge Davis 
granted the motion, ultimately staying matters pending the appointment of counsel. 
R. 1178/4; 1674/6. 
8 
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It would take nearly two-and-a-half years from the filing of the petition before 
the court was able to conduct the competency hearing. R. 1923/8. During that time, 
the court ordered Kent Willis, of the Utah County Attorney's Office Civil Division, 
to help Defendant locate prospective counsel. R. 1538/6. Mr. Willis advertised for 
an attorney to represent Defendant and forwarded the three responses to 
Defendant. R. 1180-84/4. Defendant not only insisted on participating in the 
selection, but: (1) actively sought a court order requiring the State to provide 
complete discovery to each of the responding counsel to ensure the necessary pre-
selection "meeting of the minds regarding a defensive strategy"; and (2) filed suit 
against the county sheriff and argued to the trial court that the suit prevented the 
county from taking any part in the selection of counsel. R. 1188-90/4; 1195-99/4; 
1212-15/4; 1543/6. In the end, Randall Gaither entered his appearance on 
Defendant's behalf on December 5, 2005, and was allowed to withdraw a month 
later at Defendant's request. R. 1219/4; 1232/4; 1236/4; 1538/6. 
Judge Davis ultimately granted the competency petition, ordering 
appointment of two alienists and a stay of all other proceedings. R. 1240-53/4; 1298-
1301/5. When Defendant refused to cooperate with one alienist, the court ordered a 
third alienist appointed who was not on Defendant's list of alienists to be 
disqualified. R. 1303-06/5; 1308/5; 1373/5; 1377-78/5; 1537/6; 1570/6; 1646/6. 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Defendant moved to strike the report of one of the alienists, Dr. Juan A. Mejia, 
and, in open court with Defendant present, the court set an evidentiary hearing on 
the motion. R. 1385-1402/5; 1454/5; 1456-68/5. When Defendant refused to be 
transported the morning of the hearing, Judge Davis found him in contempt and 
ordered that the case would not proceed until Defendant paid all witness costs 
associated with the hearing. R. 1470-71/6; 1477-79/6. Defendant challenged the 
ruling and continued in his repetitive efforts to recuse Judge Davis and to stay 
matters pending entry of an order granting him access to an adequate law library 
and confidential contact with prospective counsel. R. 1485-97/6; 1507-14/6; 1515-
27/6. -
Before the contempt challenge could be heard, the case was transferred to 
Judge Claudia Laycock pursuant to normal rotation as of October 1, 2006.5 R. 
1529/ 6; 1534/ 6. Defendant continued to file various motions, notices and affidavits, 
despite Judge Laycock's recognition of the stay, pending the competency decision. 
R. 1536-38/6; 1789-92/7. On October 2, 2006, Judge Laycock heard argument on 
5
 By that time, Defendant had been represented briefly by five different legal 
counsel. R. 1559/6. However, nearly all the documents filed by the defense were in 
fact prepared and filed by Defendant himself. Id. Judge Davis observed that while 
Defendant's initial pro se documents included little or no legal support for his 
claims, his legal filings improved considerably in the wake of his exposure to legal 
resources and in light of his above-average intelligence. R. 1539-59/6. 
10 
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Defendant's challenge to the contempt order, ultimately refusing to vacate the order 
but holding that payment of the fees would not stall further proceedings. R. 1570/6; 
1672-79/6. She also denied Defendant's motion to strike Dr. Mejia's report, ordered 
the additional competency evaluation requested by the State, and, thereafter, 
attempted twice without success to appoint an alienist with whom Defendant 
would cooperate. R. 1372-78/5; 1470/6; 1537/6; 1570/6; 1646/6; 1672-79/6. 
In December 2006, Judge Laycock formally reviewed with Defendant the 
various ways a defendant could waive his right to counsel pursuant to State v. 
Houston, 2006 UT App 437,147 P.3d 543, conducted the requisite colloquy pursuant 
to State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183 (Utah 1987), discussed the objectionable conduct 
that was to be curtailed, and granted Defendant a third set of twenty-five phone 
«# • • 
calls to prospective counsel as well as a continuance of the competency hearing to 
aid in Defendant's search for counsel. R. 1684-85/6; 1723/7; 1726/7; 1766/7; R. 
2970:19-22; R. 2971:passim; R. 2972:4. The judge also warned Defendant that if he 
appeared at the competency hearing without counsel, he would have to represent 
himself. R. 2972:18-19. Defendant appeared without counsel at the competency 
hearing on February 2,2007, and asked that the hearing be vacated to permit him to 
retain counsel. R. 1894/8. The court ruled that he had knowingly and voluntarily 
waived his right to counsel by his dilatory conduct, ordered that he was to represent 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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himself until such time as he retained counsel, and proceeded with the scheduled 
hearing. R. 1851-52/7; 1869-70/7; 1919/8; 1889-94/8. 
Following the two-part competency hearing, the court found Defendant 
competent to proceed to trial. R. 1851-52/7; 1869-70/7; 1900-23/8. The court based 
its decision on expert reports and testimony, the evidence and arguments, and the 
judge's "own view of the defendant's intelligence, logic, reasoning, and rational 
behavior." R. 1907/8. She agreed "without doubt" with the parties' stipulation 
that there was "no issue with regard to defendant's ability to have a rational and 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him or of the punishment 
specified for the offense charged." R. 1906/8. She noted Defendant's IQ of 111 and 
commented that he "demonstrates at least that level of intelligence in all of his court 
appearances." Id. Moreover, she ruled, he "consistently displays the ability to 
consult with counsel—indeed, the ability to act as his own counsel." R. 1901/8. 
Accordingly, she held that, although Defendant was "suffering from a mental 
disorder, he [had] a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him or of the punishment specified for the offense charged and he [had] the ability 
to consult with his counsel and to participate in the proceedings against him with a 
reasonable degree of rational understanding." Id. (emphasis in original). 
Accordingly, she ruled him competent to proceed. Id. 
12 
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The Preliminary Hearing, Mental Evaluation, and Trial: 2/2/07 - 3/20/08 
Judge Laycock's appearance in the case did nothing to slow Defendant's pro se 
filings. In addition to filing a myriad of motions on new matters, he continued his 
attempts to recuse the district court judge, to challenge venue and custody, and to 
request relief for the alleged deprivation of his rights involving selection of counsel, 
confidentiality in mail and phone calls, and access to legal materials. R. 1579-1603/6; 
1604-16/6; 1623-45/6; 1705-21/7; 1731-33/7; 1737-41/7; 1742-64/7; 1799-1846/7; 
1958-74/8; 2031-65/8; 2172/9. He also filed several additional petitions for 
interlocutory review of various adverse rulings. R. 1648/6; 1691-94/6; 1728/7; 
1771/7; 2094-96/9; 2144-47/9. The appellate court denied all interlocutory petitions, 
and Judge Laycock denied or otherwise rejected the repetitive challenges filed in the 
district court. R. 1619-20/6; 1621-22/6; 1667-71/6; 1696/7; 1778/7; 1857/7; 1875/7; 
1872-73/7; 1986/8; 2011-25/8; 2255-57/9. 
At his arraignment in September 2007, Defendant pled not guilty by reason of 
insanity, prompting the court to order an examination of his mental condition at the 
time of the offense, as provided in Utah Code Ann. §77-16a-301 (West 2004)1 R. 
2121-22/9; 2128/9; 2136/9; 2161-64/9, 2174-77/9; 2206-10/9; 2212/9; 2215-17/9. 
When the initial reports failed to adequately address "the appropriate criteria/' the 
judge issued an amended order expressly directing that the evaluations address 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
whether defendant, at the time of the offense suffered from a mental illness "that 
prevented him from forming the intent" for the charged crimes. R. 2216/9. 
Defendant challenged the order, the evaluators, and the ultimate reports, seeking to 
remove the language pertaining to "intent" or to prevent use at trial of any 
testimony relevant to such language, without success. R. 2261-80/9; 2478-79/10. 
Seven months and two volumes of pleadings after the preliminary hearing, 
Defendant represented himself at trial. R. 2540/11; 2548/11; 2596/11. After three 
days, the jury found him guilty of all four charges and unanimously found that he 
was not mentally ill at the time of the offense. R. 2586-90/11; 2595/11. 
Post Judgment Motions and Sentencing: 3/21/08 - 4/28/09 
Defendant filed a number of post-trial motions, sought the appointment of 
counsel, and finally completed an affidavit of indigency. R. 2513-24/11; 2627-45/11; 
2646-53/11; 2679/12. The court directed that he file no more pre-sentence motions 
and appointed the public defender's office. R. 2679/12. Mr. Thomas Means 
appeared for Defendant and was replaced by conflict counsel a month later. R. 
2687/12; 2690/12. When Defendant claimed a conflict with new counsel, the court 
refused to allow Mr. Means to withdraw and ultimately ruled that no conflict 
existed. R. 2692/12; 2695-96/12; 2699/12. Mr. Means later filed a motion to arrest 
the judgment, and Defendant again sought his withdrawal from the case. R. 2732-
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74/12; 2780-81/12. The court granted the withdrawal, and Defendant filed his own 
pro se motion to arrest the judgment. R. 2780-81/12; 2782-2835/12; 2845/12. 
Following oral argument, Judge Laycock denied the motion, finding that Defendant 
had failed to prove his claims. R. 2849-50/12. Specifically, the ruling reflected that: 
(1) there was no evidence to establish that the facts proven at trial did not constitute 
a public offense; (2) defendant had demonstrated his "sophisticated reasoning 
abilities and above average intelligence during the pendency of this matterf,]" 
supporting the jury's rejection of his claim of mental illness or insanity; (3) the judge 
affirmed her previous decision that, following appropriate warnings, Defendant 
waived his right to counsel by his dilatory conduct; and (4) no "attempt" instruction 
was warranted absent a charge that he attempted to commit a crime and absent any 
request for such an instruction from either party. R. 2849-50/12; 2860-63/12. 
At the sentencing hearing on March 25,2009, the court addressed Defendant's 
objections to the presentence investigation report, denied his rule 402 motion, then 
sentenced him to the statutory term for each charge and running everything 
concurrently except the felony counts, which she ran consecutively. R. 2854-56/12. 
The judge also recommended that Defendant receive credit for the 2,103 days he had 
already served incarcerated. R. 2855/12. 
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Defendant sought to file a direct appeal, filing a notice of appeal on April 28, 
2009. R. 2858-59/12. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 21,2003, Officer Ray Edwards attempted to execute an arrest warrant 
against Defendant, who was riding his bike at Bridal Veil Falls. R. 2664/11. 
Defendant swung his bike at the officer, hitting him with the rear tire. Id. The 
officer pulled his gun and ordered Defendant to stop, and Defendant ran. Id. 
Officer Edwards gave chase, ultimately reaching Defendant and grabbing him by 
the arm. Id. The two struggled, Defendant attempted, without success, to take the 
officer's gun from its holster, then Defendant broke free and fled on his bike. Id. 
Several officers arrived and, after a brief search, found Defendant hiding 
under a tree. Id. Defendant once again fled, only to run into Officer Mike Reynolds 
and Deputy Jens Horn. Id. Officer Reynolds drew his weapon and ordered 
Defendant to lie down, then noticed that Defendant was holding a knife. R. 
2663/11. Officer Reynolds yelled, "Knife!" as Defendant swung it towards him. 
Deputy Horn tackled Defendant from the side, ultimately subduing him. Id. Only 
after Defendant was in custody did the deputy feel a dull pain in his upper chest 
area. Id. He discovered a cut in his shirt and an incision in his chest. Id. He was 
treated at the hospital for a wound approximately 1" long and 1 W' deep. Id. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant's no tic of appeal was untimely filed, leaving this Court 
without jurisdiction to hear this appeal. 
Point II. Most of Defendant's challenges to the lower court's determination 
that he waived his right to counsel through his dilatory conduct should be 
summarily rejected by this Court because they are presented without reference to 
legal or record support and lack meaningful analysis. A review of the relevant 
proceedings below demonstrates that Judge Laycock handled the matter thoroughly 
and completely and demonstrates that Defendant's claim of confusion lacks merit. 
Point III. Summary contempt proceedings were appropriate where the 
contempt occurred in open court, disturbed the court's business, and necessitated 
immediate punishment. In any event, Defendant had reasonable notice and a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard as to his contemptuous conduct when he 
challenged the contempt order both verbally and in writing. His failure to marshal 
the evidence to support his challenge to Judge Laycock's findings defeats the 
remainder of his claim of error. Nevertheless, Judge Laycock's rejection of the 
defense that the minute entry given to Defendant reflected a different time is fully 
supported by the Judge's ability to review the minute entry, which was admitted 
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into evidence at the hearing, as well as evidence placing Defendant in court when 
Judge Davis set the hearing for 8:30 a.m. 
Point IV. Defendant's challenge to Judge Lay cock's amended order for an 
evaluation of Defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense fails for 
inadequate briefing. In any event, his claim is without merit where the order 
accurately reflects the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305 and does not 
address the admissibility of the information in the evaluations but leaves the issue 
of admissibility to be determined at trial. 
Point V. Defendant's claim of a Brady violation lacks merit where he makes 
no attempt to establish that the computer disc he sought below included any 
material exculpatory evidence. His claim that the disc "contains evidence in digital 
form that is exculpatory" is wholly inadequate to establish his claim of error. 
Point VI. Defendant's challenge to exclusion of a police report and a crime 
lab report offered by the defense at trial fails for inadequate briefing. 
Point VII. Defendant's challenge to exclusion of two previous competency 
rulings lacks sufficient authority or analysis to permit appellate review and should 
be summarily rejected due to inadequate briefing. 
Point VIII. Defendant invited any error in the court's failure to give his 
proposed jury instruction defining "attempt" when, after discussing instructions on 
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the last day of trial, he made no mention of the missing instruction and ultimately 
agreed to the instructions as they were given. 
Point IX. Defendant's claim of per se error in the trial court's failure to arrest 
judgment due to the absence of a jury instruction defining "attempt" fails for 
inadequate briefing. His claim that the conduct of jail personnel throughout the 
proceedings below robbed him of his right to counsel of choice and warranted an 
arrest of judgment "as a matter of law" also lacks the full support and analysis 
required by this Court's briefing rules and should be summarily rejected. 
Point X Defendant's claim of cumulative error fails in the absence of his 
ability to establish any errors that undermine confidence that he obtained a fair trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT'S NOTICE OF APPEAL IS UNTIMELY ABSENT A 
COMPLETED "NOTARIZED STATEMENT OR WRITTEN 
DECLARATION/' LEAVING THIS COURT WITHOUT 
JURISDICTION OVER THIS APPEAL 
This case is before this Court on a direct appeal from a criminal conviction 
and sentencing. Defendant's pro se notice of appeal, however, was untimely filed, 
preventing this Court from acquiring jurisdiction to consider the merits of the 
appeal. See Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299, f 7,13 P.3d 616 ("If an 
appeal is not timely filed, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal."). 
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A notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days after entry of the order or 
judgment appealed. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). The time period for filing an appeal is 
jurisdictional. See State v. Bowers, 2002 UT 100, <f 5,57 P.3d 1065. In a criminal case, 
it is the sentence that constitutes the final judgment from which to appeal. See id. at 
% 4. However, in the case of an inmate confined in an institution, "the notice of 
appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail system on or 
before the last day for filing/, Utah R. App. P. 4(g). 
Judgment was entered below on March 25,2009. R. 2854-56/12. Hence, 
the pro se notice of appeal was due on Friday, April 24. It was stamped by the 
court as received the following Tuesday, April 28. R. 2859/12. Defendant claims 
that the notice of appeal was timely filed under subsection 4(g) because he filed it 
<0 
by putting it in the prison mail on April 20. See Aplt. Br. at 12. 
The inmate rule does not salvage this appeal, however, because Defendant 
failed to comply with its provisions. The rule provides that "[t]imely filing may 
be shown by a notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of 
deposit and stating that first-class postage has been prepaid/' Utah R. App. P. 
4(g). The notice of appeal contained in the appellate record reflects that it was 
signed on April 17 and is accompanied by a "Certificate of Mailing/' See R. 
2858-59/12 (copy of Notice of Appeal is attached in Addendum A). However, 
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the date on which the document was mailed is blank, reflecting only that it was 
mailed, postage pre-paid, "on _ , 2009[.]" R. 2858/12. The envelope is in 
which it was sent is not attached to clarify the matter. 
Defendant claims that the State stipulated to a mailing date of April 20. See 
Aplt. Br. at 12. He is referring to the State's response to his pre-briefing "Motion 
for Extraordinary Relief" which this Court treated as a motion to stay. The 
State's response—filed nine months before the appellate record was filed — 
explained that the State's case file included the envelope in which it received a 
copy of the notice of appeal. R. 2875. That envelope reflects a metered date of 
April 20, which would be within the time provided by rule 4(g). See copy of 
envelope (attached in Addendum B). 
The envelope, however, establishes nothing more than the fact that the 
State's copy of the notice of appeal was sent on April 20. It does not establish 
that the court's copy was sent at the same time, and he does not explain why, if 
they were sent simultaneously, the State's document was stamped as received on 
April 21 while the court's was not received until April 28. See State's Notice of 
Appeal (attached in Addendum B); R. 2859. Neither does the State's envelope 
amount to the "notarized statement or written declaration" required by rule 4(g). 
Utah R. App. P. 4(g). An incomplete mailing certificate is tantamount to no 
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certificate at all. Thus, this Court should dismiss this appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction. See Stack v. Hatch, 2008 UT App 290U, | 3 , nl (the inmate rule did not 
invoke appellate jurisdiction where Hatch failed to file a notarized statement 
showing compliance with the rule); see also Serrato, 2000 UT App 299, \ 7. 
••' I I . 
DEFENDANT'S CONTINUED DILATORY CONDUCT AFTER 
EXPRESS WARNINGS AND AN EXPLICIT COLLOQUY 
IMPLIEDLY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Defendant claims that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel by finding that he had impliedly waived his right to counsel and would, 
therefore, have to represent himself. See Aplt. Br. at 28-35. He maintains that the 
trial court's waiver declaration was premature and, hence, erroneous because: (1) 
Defendant had a mental health condition the court knew affected his ability to 
choose counsel; (2) Defendant had a subjective belief that confidentiality was a 
"precursor" to retaining counsel; (3) the circumstances required the court "to go to 
additional lengths to secure [defense] counsel[;]" and (4) the grant of unmonitored 
phone calls and the direction that Defendant seek an ACLU attorney were 
confusing, casting doubt on the validity of the waiver that should be resolved in 
Defendant's favor. Id. at 30-35. Finally, he claims, the court was obliged to appoint 
stand-by counsel before requiring him to proceed pro se. See id. at 34. 
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A. Most of Defendant's Arguments are Inadequately Briefed 
This Court need not address the majority of Defendant's arguments because 
they are not in compliance with this Court's briefing rule. See State v. Sloan, 2003 UT 
App 170, f 15,72 P.3d 138 (refusing to address inadequately briefed issues); see also 
MacKay v. Hardy, 973 P.2d 941,948 (Utah 1998) (an inadequately briefed argument 
need not be addressed on appeal and may result in summary affirmance). Rule 
24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires, among other things, that 
each argument briefed on appeal "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented,... with citations to the authorities, 
statutes, and parts of the record relied on/' Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The appellant 
cannot simply dump the burden of their argument and research on the appellate 
court. See Smith v. Four Comers Mental Health Or., Inc., 2003 UT 23, ^  46,70 P.3d 904. 
Here, most of Defendant's arguments simply state a proposition without 
providing meaningful legal analysis or record support. His claim that his mental 
condition affected his ability to choose counsel and that the trial court knew of the 
connection lacks not only record citation, but citation to authority identifying the 
condition and connecting it to his ability to choose counsel. See Aplt. Br. at 30, 32, 
35. To the contrary, Judge Laycock ultimately rejected the idea, finding that 
Defendant possessed "the ability to consult with his counsel and to participate in the 
23 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
{ 
proceedings against him with a reasonable degree of rational understanding/' R. 
1901/8. 
Even if, as he claims, it was reasonable for him to believe that confidentiality 
must occur before he could hire counsel, he provides no authority to establish that 
his belief justifies his failure to hire counsel and prevents an implied waiver given 
the trial court's express warnings and colloquy. See Aplt. Br. at 32-33. 
Similarly, he offers no authority for his assertions that the trial court is 
responsible for enforcing confidentiality at the jail or that the judge was required to 
make additional efforts to secure counsel for him, despite his repeated insistence 
below on retaining his own counsel.6 See id. at 31-33. 
6
 It is difficult to know what more the court could have done. The court tried 
any number of ways to assist Defendant in obtaining counsel, including: appointing 
counsel numerous times, appointing counsel for specific purposes, calling around to 
secure conflict counsel, enlisting the help of the civil division of the county 
attorney's office to advertise for counsel, continuing countless hearings to permit 
Defendant more time to retain counsel, granting Defendant 75 confidential phone 
calls to prospective counsel, and inviting Defendant to send letters to prospective 
counsel, directing him as to wording so as to increase the odds of getting responses. 
See, e.g., R. 6-8/1; 223/1; 654-55/3; 897/4; 1031/4; 1059-62/4; 1383/5; 1538-56/6; 
1559/6; 2684/12; 2687/12; R. 2963:46; R. 2970:19-22. Defendant ultimately resisted 
all the court's efforts. See generally R. 2964:39, 43 (filing a federal suit against the 
judge when he attempted to appoint counsel); R. 651/3 (rejecting female counsel); R. 
2964:52-53 (rejecting female counsel); R. 2971:25; R. 2972:12-13 (objecting to Judge 
Lay cock's offer to call the warden to ensure confidentiality, calling it an improper ex 
parte communication). 
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Defendant fails to demonstrate that appointment of stand-by counsel is a 
precursor to an implied waiver of the right to counsel. See id. at 34. Not only does 
the claim lack authority and analysis, it ignores Defendant's failure to request stand-
by counsel below, and when Judge Davis attempted to appoint conflict counsel in a 
supervisory capacity, Defendant filed a federal lawsuit against the judge. R. 
2964:39,43. 
Because these claims lack legal authority, record support and/ or meaningful 
legal analysis, this Court should decline to address them. See State v. Garner, 2002 
UT App 234,118,13,52 P.3d 467. 
B. The Record Demonstrates a Voluntary, Knowing, and 
Intelligent Waiver by Conduct 
Defendant also claims that he was confused by the court's grant of additional 
confidential phone calls with which to hire counsel, followed by a suggestion from 
the judge that Defendant "hire an attorney to assist him in hiring an attorney/' See 
Aplt Br. at 33. That confusion, he contends, prevents imposition of an implied 
waiver. See id. at 34 (citing State v. Pedockie, 2006 UT 28,137 P.3d 716). His argument 
fails inasmuch as the record reveals no confusion in the lower court's discussion. 
The Sixth Amendment implicitly allows a defendant to waive the right to the 
assistance of counsel and proceed pro se. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806,818-32 
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(1975); State v. Cabrera, 2007 UT App 194,115,163 P.3d 707. The Utah Supreme 
Court has identified three ways a defendant may waive his right to counsel. See 
Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, f 27; Cabrera, 2007 UT App 194,115; accord State v. Houston, 
2006 UT App 437, | | 6-7,147 P.3d 543. First, a defendant may relinquish his right 
to counsel by "true waiver" through an on-the-record colloquy with the trial court 
in which the defendant is informed of the importance of counsel and still chooses 
knowingly and voluntarily to proceed pro se. See Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, f|[ 27-30. 
Second, a defendant may forfeit his right to counsel through "'extremely dilatory 
conduct' or abusive behavior, such as physically assaulting counsel." Id. at f f^ 31-32 
(quoting United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1101 (3d Cir.1995)). Finally, a 
defendant may give up his right to counsel through "waiver by conduct" or 
"implied waiver," which occurs when a defendant who has been warned that he 
will lose his right to counsel if he continues to engage in dilatory tactics continues to 
misbehave. Id. at ^ 33; see also Cabrera, 2007 UT App 194, f 15. 
An implied waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. See Cabrera, 
2007 UT App 194, |^f 15-16. To be voluntary, the court must warn defendant of the 
unacceptable conduct at issue and that its continuation will result in a waiver of the 
right to counsel. See id. at ^ 16. "Unacceptable conduct" includes a defendant's 
failure to hire an attorney despite having the financial resources to do so. Pedockie, 
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2006 UT 28, f 35, n. 36. To be knowing and intelligent, the court must ensure that 
defendant is aware of the "'disadvantages and dangers of self-representation[.]'" 
Cabrera, 2007 UT App 194,116 (quoting Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, f 39). The best means 
to ensure that a waiver is knowing and intelligent is a colloquy on the record. See id. 
Defendant does not contend that he was not informed of the unacceptable 
conduct, of the potential result of its continuation, or of the pitfalls of self-
representation. See Aplt. Br. at 28-35. Instead, he claims that Judge Laycock's 
explanations confused him and dictate against a finding of waiver by conduct. See 
id. at 33-34. His claim lacks record support. 
Judge Laycock issued the necessary explanations and warnings and 
conducted a thorough colloquy before finding that Defendant's continued dilatory 
conduct waived his right to counsel. She began on November 13,2006—three-and-
one-half years into the proceedings and fifteen months prior to trial. The parties 
met in court to discuss the status of the competency proceedings. R. 2970:2. The 
judge explained the objectionable conduct to Defendant: his dilatory efforts to 
obtain counsel, despite having "upwards of 50 [court-ordered] phone calls" to 
obtain counsel, having "one of the best" defense counsel available to him, and 
having and rejecting "the opportunity to have very fine Counsel[.]" R. 2970:18-25. 
They discussed Defendant's concerns for confidentiality and his perceived need to 
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acquire "the equivalent of a law school education" before he could make an 
informed decision about who to hire. R. 2970:18-22. In the end, the court made it 
clear to Defendant that neither concern was to delay his retention of counsel any 
longer and that his appearance without counsel at the competency hearing would 
mean he had decided to represent himself and would waive the right to counsel. R. 
2970:18-19. The judge then gave Defendant 25 additional confidential phone calls — 
in addition to the 50 previously been given by other judges — to facilitate his search 
for counsel before the competency hearing. R. 2970:19-23. Thus, the judge gave 
Defendant the information necessary to render his subsequent waiver voluntary. 
See Houston, 2006 UT App 437, f 8. 
The colloquy establishing that the waiver was knowing and intelligent 
occurred at the next hearing. After setting the competency hearing for December 20, 
Judge Laycock checked over the following days for an entry of appearance by 
defense counsel. . R. 2970:23; R. 2971:2-3. Seeing none, she set a hearing for 
December 4 to assess the status of Defendant's search. R. 2971:2-4. She discovered 
that Defendant had waited a week after the previous hearing before initiating any 
call for counsel. R. 2971:5-6. Defendant claimed to have been waiting for a written 
order from the court and, when asked about his "last real efforts" to obtain counsel, 
he confirmed that they were in early 2006. R. 2971:5-8. 
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Defendant's continued dilatory efforts prompted the judge to proceed with 
the colloquy required by Houston. R. 2973:10. She began by obtaining Defendant's 
assurance that he had "more than enough" funds to retain counsel. R. 2971:9-10. 
She then identified and defined the "three types of waiver of [cjounsel" recognized 
in Utah, emphasizing the third type: waiver by conduct. R. 2971:10-11. She 
explained that such a waiver could be found once the court warned a defendant that 
there was a problem and gave him a chance to change his behavior, and she 
explained that Defendant's problem involved his "dilatory tactics[.]" R. 2971:11. 
Not only had Defendant had more than three years and "many opportunities to get 
Counsel" and failed to do so, she explained, but he seemed to "enjoy acting as [his 
own] attorney[.]" R. 2971:11-12. She was "very, very concerned" by his continued 
insistence on a legal education before hiring counsel, noting that there was no right 
to or time for such an education. R. 2971:17. Defendant again blamed the court, 
claiming the judge did not give him "access" to counsel or an opportunity to have 
counsel. R. 2971:17-21. The judge stressed that by his own actions, Defendant "may 
deprive [himjself of that right." R. 2971:17. 
Over Defendant's protests, Judge Laycock walked through the remainder of 
the colloquy, touching on the time Defendant had spent in this case studying the 
law and noting how beneficial any prior experience in self-representation would be. 
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R. 2971:10-14. She explained that he knew about the charges against him and 
reviewed with him their potential sentences. R. 2971:14-15. She warned that he 
would not be able to claim his own ineffectiveness should he represent himself 
poorly, and that he risked spending "substantially the rest of [his] life in prison" if 
he made a mistake. R. 2971:15. She would give him no help if he represented 
himself, leaving him "on [his] own" and bound to comply with the rules of both 
evidence and procedure. R. 2971:15-16. She noted that he had demonstrated 
throughout the case "some familiarity" with the rules, but that he was not familiar 
enough "to make it through a trial and to do a good job[,]" emphasizing her 
remarks with a specific example in the paperwork he handed her as the hearing 
began. Id. She warned him that if he chose to testify, he could not simply tell his 
story, and he would be cross examined by experienced attorneys. Id. She expressed 
her opinion that "it would be far better for [him] to get an attorney on board" and 
that despite his apparent pleasure in acting as his own counsel, he would ultimately 
do himself "immense harm." R. 2971:16-18. 
At the end of the hearing, Defendant again asked for unmonitored calls, and 
the judge offered to call the jail to ensure it. R. 2971:24. Instead, the judge issued a 
written order when Defendant objected to what he claimed would be an "ex parte 
communication with close associates of the alleged victims." R. 2971:25. 
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Shortly thereafter, Defendant moved to continue the competency hearing, 
outlining his most recent efforts to obtain counsel R. 1731-33/7. Judge Laycock 
granted the motion and moved the hearing to February 2. R. 2972:17. In doing so, 
she stated that she would not "micro-manage the jail" and that if Defendant 
"needed help in dealing with... [his] grievances with the jail," he could "contact an 
attorney from the ACLU." R. 2972:10. She also stressed that the added time 
permitted him not only to call counsel, but to write to them, and she detailed how 
best to address the envelope to ensure confidentiality, and how important it was to 
assure the recipients that he had "the means to retain them." R. 2972:12-13. She 
reminded Defendant of the warnings she gave at the previous hearing about the 
dangers and perils of self-representation and reiterated her advice that he "do 
whatever is necessary" to get counsel because the hearing was "going to go 
forward" whether or not he appeared with counsel R. 2972:18. 
Defendant later attempted to continue the February hearing, again blaming 
the jail and the judge for his lack of counsel because he was given no confidential 
contact with prospective attorneys. R. 1798-1846/7; R. 2973:8,10. Judge Laycock 
found the claim to be "without any value or validity" in view of the "years . . . of 
opportunities [he has had] to obtain Counsel[,]" multiple attempts from various 
judges to help him obtain counsel, the appearance of both appointed and private 
31 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
counsel in this matter, and the availability of funds to retain counsel. R. 2973:10-12. 
At the request of the prosecution, the judge again addressed all of the issues 
required by Houston, opining that, while Defendant's "extremely dilatory conduct" 
"probably" amounted to forfeiture of the right to counsel, it definitely amounted to 
a waiver by conduct. R. 2973:13-14. She reiterated her warnings to Defendant that 
continuation of that conduct could amount to a waiver of counsel, and she reviewed 
the opportunities he had been given to avoid the waiver. R. 2973:14-15. She 
ultimately found that although Defendant claimed to want counsel, he knowingly 
and voluntarily waived that right through his continued dilatory tactics. R. 2973:14-
20. The judge stressed that Defendant could still obtain counsel "at any time" but 
that until then, he would represent himself. R. 2973:19-20: Defendant continued to 
complain about the lack of confidentiality in his attempts to hire counsel, but when 
the matter came before the court for trial thirteen months later, Defendant 
proceeded to represent himself without voicing any request for stand-by counsel or 
any concern for proceeding pro se. 
Based on the foregoing, the record is clear that Defendant implicitly waived 
his right to counsel by his dilatory conduct. See Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, ^|f 45-51. 
Defendant's waiver was voluntary because the trial court explicitly identified the 
unacceptable conduct and unequivocally warned Defendant that he must hire an 
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attorney to represent him at the competency hearing or proceed pro se. See Cabrera, 
2007 UT App 194, ^  16. It was knowing and intelligent because the court adhered to 
Houston and was equally clear in providing a thorough colloquy at two hearings. 
See id. Unlike the situation in Pedockie, nothing in Judge Laycock's statements were 
inconsistent or confusing, and she provided Defendant with ample opportunity to 
correct the unacceptable conduct and avoid a waiver. See Pedockie, 2006 UT 28, |^f 
47-50 (no implied waiver because the court sua sponte imposed a waiver at a time 
when Pedockie did nothing objectionable, and because Pedockie was never given a 
colloquy or its equivalent). As there is no justification for Defendant's refusal to 
comply with Judge Laycock's warning and to hire counsel, this Court should affirm 
the finding of an implied waiver of the right to counsel. 
in. 
THE SUMMARY CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS WERE 
JUSTIFIED, DEFENDANT HAD ADEQUATE NOTICE AND AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND, AND JUDGE LAYCOCK 
PROPERLY AFFIRMED THE CONTEMPT ORDER 
Defendant contends that he is entitled to a reversal of Judge Davis' order 
finding him in contempt for failing to attend an evidentiary hearing scheduled at 
Defendant's request. See Aplt. Br. at 35-38. Specifically, he argues that the alleged 
contempt was criminal in nature and carried with it a constitutional right to a 
hearing and an opportunity to defend himself against the contempt charge, both of 
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n 
which he was denied. Id. at 26, 35-38 (Point III). On the contrary, summary 
proceedings were justified and, in any event, appropriate due process protections 
were observed where Defendant had notice and an opportunity to defend against 
the contemptuous conduct. Defendant also challenges the propriety of Judge 
Lay cock's findings underlying her affirmance of the contempt order. See id. at 38-41 
(Point IV). His failure to marshal the evidence, however, defeats his claim. 
Background. Defendant's argument concerns an evidentiary hearing that 
was scheduled for August 14,2006, pursuant to several defense motions, including 
Defendant's motion to strike the competency report of Dr. Mejia. R. 1454/5; 1477-
79/6. Dr. Mejia had been subpoenaed for the hearing and was in court. R. 1478/6. 
Despite having been present in court on August 7 when Judge Davis set the hearing 
for 8:30 a.m., and having been given a copy of the minute entry reflecting the time of 
the August 14 hearing, Defendant refused to be transported for the hearing, later 
claiming that he thought the hearing was scheduled for the afternoon.8 R. 1454-
55/5; 1479/6; 1493-97/6; 1539/6. Judge Davis was ultimately informed of the 
7
 Defendant's one-sentence assertion of a deprivation of other unidentified 
"legal rights" (Aplt. Br. at 38) is inadequately briefed and is not further addressed 
herein. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43,1(23, n.9,48 P.3d 918. 
8
 No transcript of the August 7 and 14 hearings appears in the appellate 
record. 
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situation by "jail transportation" and found that Defendant had voluntarily 
absented himself from the hearing, held him in contempt, and ordered him to pay 
Dr. Mejia's costs associated with the hearing.9 R. 1477-79/6; 1539/6 (the contempt 
order is attached in Addendum C). 
Defendant filed a motion challenging the decision and argued it to newly-
assigned Judge Laycock on October 2, 2006. R. 1486-97/6; 1539/6; R. 2969:11-13. 
He gave her his copy of the August 7 minute entry and argued that it appeared to 
reflect that the hearing was to start at 2:30 p.m. R. 2969:11-12. Judge Laycock 
acknowledged that the minute entry copy could be viewed as either an "8" or a "2," 
but was unpersuaded by Defendant's argument, finding instead that that Defendant 
had voluntarily absented himself from the August 14 hearing. R. 1677-78/6 (the 
written ruling is attached in Addendum C). She relied on evidence that Defendant 
was present in court on August 7 when the hearing was set for 8:30 a.m., that 
Defendant received a copy of the minute entry as a reminder, and that when jail 
transportation officers sought to transport him for the scheduled hearing, Defendant 
could have gone but chose not to. Id.10 
9
 The State later submitted an invoice from Dr. Mejia totaling $875.00. R. 1660-
62/6. The record does not reflect that Defendant paid the invoice. 
10Defendant sought to challenge Judge Laycock's decision by filing his twelfth 
petition for interlocutory review (Case No. 20061112—CA) as well as a notice of 
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A, Judge Davis'Contempt Order 
Defendant argues that Judge Davis violated his procedural due process rights 
by entering an ex parte criminal contempt order and proceeding in a summary 
fashion when the situation involved a matter of "indirect" contempt requiring 
compliance with heightened procedural protections.11 See Aplt. Br. at 35-38. 
Contrary to his assertions, the proceedings below were justified and afforded him 
the necessary procedural protections. 
Summary contempt sanctions are appropriate under certain circumstances. 
See Gardiner v. York, 2010 UT App 108, 1 40, 233 P.3d 500; Von Hake v. Tliomas, 
759 P.2d 1162,1171 (Utah 1988) (failure to appear in violation of court order can, 
appeal (Case No. 20061137-CA). R. 1771-73/7; 1778/7; 1875/7; 1986/8; see also 
State v. Santonio, 2007 UT App 108U (per curiam). This Court denied the former 
filing and dismissed the appeal for lack of a final appealable order. R. 1778/7; 
1986/ 8; Santonio, 2007 UT App 108U. 
Judge Laycock also rejected Defendant's challenge to Dr. Mejia's fees. R. 
2017/8; 2025/8. Defendant filed an appeal which this Court dismissed for lack of a 
final appealable order. See State v. Santonio, 2007 UT App 386U (per curiam). This 
Court held that the contempt order was "clearly remedial in nature" and, hence, 
civil, not criminal, as Defendant now claims. Id.; Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 
1167-68 & n.4 (Utah 1988). That decision is binding. See IHC Health Services, Inc. u. D 
& K Management, Inc., 2008 UT 73, f t 26,28,196 P.3d 588. 
11
 Defendant makes a cursory reference to the state constitution, but provides 
no separate state constitutional analysis. Hence, this Court need only address his 
federal constitutional claim. See State v. Talbot, 2010 UT App 352, f 6, n.4, — P.3d — 
-, 2010 WL 4997096. 
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in appropriate circumstances, be treated as "direct contempt"). However, the 
labels of "direct" and "indirect" are no longer determinative of whether such 
sanctions are appropriate. See York, 2010 UT App 108, f 39. Instead, summary 
proceedings are appropriate in cases "where the contemptuous conduct occurs in 
open court or in the presence of the judge, disturbs the court's business, and 
necessitates immediate punishment." Id. at f 40 (citing Pounders v. Watson, 521 
U.S. 982, 988,117 S. Ct. 2359 (1997) (per curiam)). These requirements were met 
in this case, justifying the summary proceedings. 
The record reflects that the contempt occurred in open court and in the 
presence of the judge. R. 1470-71/6. It "disturbed] the court's business" 
because the hearing for which Defendant failed to appear was primarily an * 
evidentiary hearing set as a result of his own motion to strike Dr. Mejia's 
competency report. R. 1402-16/5; 1454-55/5. Dr. Mejia's presence and 
Defendant's need to support his motion were predictable and necessary. . 
Accordingly, when Defendant failed to appear, the court was unable to proceed, 
despite the presence of Dr. Mejia. R. 1470-71/6. 
Finally, Defendant's voluntary absence necessitated immediate 
punishment because it was not only unnecessary and self-serving, but it was the 
latest in a series of defense-related delays that once again stalled a case that was, 
37 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
at that time, more than three years old, filled more than five volumes of 
pleadings, and had not yet progressed to a preliminary hearing. Moreover, the 
delay, which was solely attributable to Defendant and was easily avoidable, was 
not the first time Defendant had refused to be transported to court, and it 
inconvenienced not only the court and counsel, but an expert witness as well. R. 
624/3; 862/3; 994/4; 1061-62/4. Under the circumstances, it presented a 
foreboding of things to come if not immediately and memorably addressed. 
Even if the need to redress Defendant's conduct and curtail the possibility of 
its recurrence was not sufficient justification for immediate punishment, the 
requisite due process requirements were met where Defendant had both adequate 
notice and an opportunity to defend the contempt charge, albeit after the initial 
contempt order. See Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1171 n.7 (should summary proceedings 
lack justification, due process requirements may still be met where contemner is 
allowed "a reasonable opportunity to seek relief from the contempt order by 
presenting the court with facts previously unknown to it which would constitute a 
valid defense for the charge of contempt/'). 
The record reflects that Defendant received reasonable notice. He was told at 
the August 7 hearing of the time and date for the evidentiary hearing with Dr. 
Mejia, knew the hearing was being held pursuant to his own motion, knew that Dr. 
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Mejia would be there and, hence, necessarily knew his presence was required. He 
was verbally informed of the time of the hearing and was given a copy of the 
minute entry reflecting that information. R. 1454-55/5. The jail personnel's attempt 
to transport him in time for the morning hearing offered additional reinforcement 
that the hearing was set for the morning. He has at no time alleged any difficulty 
with either his memory or his hearing. In any event, Defendant admitted that he 
became aware of Judge Davis7 contempt order the same day it was announced. R. 
1493-94/6; 1497/6. 
Defendant also had a meaningful opportunity to be heard as to his 
conduct. When he heard of the contempt order, he sought relief by filing his 
motion to alter or amend it. R. 1485-97/6. That motion, and the oral argument . 
thereon, provided Defendant "a reasonable opportunity to seek relief from the 
contempt order" and satisfied the due process requirements attendant to a civil 
contempt order by providing him ample opportunity to address his 
contemptuous conduct and to present any and all defenses thereto. See Von Hake, 
759 P.2d at 1171 n.7; see also Gardiner, 2010 UT App 108, % 28/ Defendant 
presented his challenges to Judge Laycock without limitation by the court and 
was permitted to adduce evidence to support his claims. R. 1485-97/6; 1570-
71/6; R. 2969: passim. 
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Defendant contends that it was the delay in receiving a written copy of 
Judge Davis' contempt order that" denied [him] an opportunity to assert" his 
defenses of mental illness and mistake of law to Judge Laycock.n See Aplt. Br. at 
35, 38. Without the written order, he claims, he was unaware that Judge Davis 
had relied on his presence at the August 7 hearing and, hence, did not realize he 
needed to address that fact. See id. at 38-39. He fails, however, to explain how 
either of the defenses was dependent on this information. Moreover, he had the 
best notice possible: he was present in court on August 7 when he received his 
copy of the minute entry and was informed of the time of the hearing. Thus, the 
potential relevance of the hearing should have been readily apparent to him. 
Accordingly, to the extent the defenses of mental illness and mistake of law were 
insufficiently presented below, it was through Defendant's own fault, not a lack 
of notice or opportunity. R. 1486-97; R. 2969: passim. Under these circumstances, 
1 ^ Defendant has not shown that the lower court violated his due process rights. 
12
 Defendant's claim that he was prevented from asserting the defense of 
mistake of fact is without merit where his motion and his argument detailed his 
mistaken belief that the hearing was set for 2:30 p.m. instead of 8:30 a.m. See Aplt. 
Br. at 39-40; R. 1495-96/6; R. 2969:11-13, 30-31. 
13Any error in the trial court's handling of the contempt matter would affect 
the contempt order alone, not the underlying criminal conviction. See Gardiner, 2010 
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B. Judge Laycock's Affirmance 
Defendant also challenges Judge Laycock's affirmance of the contempt 
order, arguing that the judge erred in (1) finding that he was required to go to 
court when requested by jail staff and (2) not finding that his conduct was in 
keeping with his reading of the minute entry. See Aplt. Br. at 38-41. 
To the extent Defendant challenges Judge Lay cock's findings of fact, his 
failure to properly marshal the evidence defeats his claims. See Ostermiller v. 
Ostermiller, 2010 UT 43, | | 19-24, 233 P.3d 489 (holding an appellate court may 
decline to address a challenged factual finding where challenger fails to marshal 
supporting evidence); State v. Hurst, 821 R2d 467,471 (Utah App. 1991) 
(accepting challenged finding and conclusion regarding contempt order due to 
defendant's failure to marshal). 
In any event, neither challenge requires reversal of Judge Laycock's 
decision. Defendant's claim involves Judge Laycock's comments that the fluidity 
of court schedules and judicial proceedings requires inmates to go to court 
whenever asked by jail personnel. R. 2969:32 (written and verbal rulings 
attached in Addendum C). However, his contempt was not founded on his 
UT App 108, f 48 (reversing improper contempt order independent of underlying 
judgment). 
41 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
refusal to go to court when jail personnel requested it It was founded on his 
refusal to be transported after having been told personally the previous week 
what time he had to be at court for the hearing: what Judge Laycock viewed as 
the "bottom line." R. 1677-78/6; R. 2969:31-32. Whether the request of jail 
personnel is viewed as a reaffirmation of the early court setting or, as Defendant 
claims, a compulsion of which he was unaware, the contempt ruling remains 
valid under the relevant facts, and Defendant's challenge fails. 
Finally, Judge Laycock was not required to accept Defendant's assertion 
that he believed the minute entry said 2:30 given evidence putting Defendant in 
court on August 7 and given Defendant's copy of the minute entry. R. 2969:11-
12,31-32. The judgeacknowledged that the minute entry could be read as 
either an 8 or a 2, but in view of the remaining evidence, she was unpersuaded 
that Defendant did not know that the hearing was at 8:30. R. 2969:31. That 
decision is fully supported by the evidence. 
IV, 
THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY REQUIRED RE-EVALUATION 
OF DEFEND ANTS MENTAL STATE TO FOCUS ON THE IMPACT 
OF ANY MENTAL ILLNESS ON HIS ABILITY TO FORM THE 
REQUISITE INTENT FOR THE CHARGED CRIMES 
When Defendant entered pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity at his 
arraignment, the judge ordered "the Department of Human Services to examine 
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the defendant and investigate his mental condition at the time of the offense" as 
provided in Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-301. R. 2136-37/9; 2177/9. The judge 
eventually received two reports and determined that one did "not consider the 
appropriate criteria," while the other was "somewhat closer in its analysis." R. 
2217. The court then ordered both experts to answer the following question: 
Did the defendant, at the time of the offense, suffer from a 
mental illness as defined in UCA § 76-2-305(4)(a), that prevented him 
from forming the intent to intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly 
commit the crimes with which he is charged? 
R. 2216/9 (attached in Addendum D); Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(l)(a) (emphasis in 
court's order). 
Defendant contends that this order improperly permitted the evaluating 
psychologists "to testify by inference" regarding the ultimate issue of whether he 
was able to form the requisite intent to commit the crimes, thereby violating rule 
704(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.14 See Aplt. Br. at 42. 
Defendant also purports to argue that the trial court's entry of multiple 
orders regarding his evaluation undermined his ability to represent himself and 
violated his federal due process rights. See Aplt. Br, at 26-27 (referring to original 
order (R. 2156-64/9), order as amended at Defendant's request (R. 2174-77/9), and 
order challenged in the text of his argument (R. 2215-17/9). Inasmuch as the claim 
appears only in the Summary of Arguments, the State does not address the claims 
further. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); see also Russell v. Tliomas, 2000 UT App 82, | 9, 
n.9,999 P. 2d 1244 (refusing to address an issue raised in the Summary of Argument 
section but not developed in the argument section). 
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Rule 704(b) provides: 
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or 
condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or 
inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental 
state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a 
defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact 
alone. 
Utah R. Evid. 704(b). He further claims that the order "imposes criteria stricter than 
the statute, which had the effect of confusing the issue and eliminating defendant's 
lawful affirmative defense." Aplt. Br. at 42. He offers no elaboration. See id. 
This Court should decline to address the latter claim because it is not 
adequately briefed. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, If 13 ("An 
issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to 
shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing court."). The language 
quoted above represents the entirety of Defendant's argument. See Aplt. Br. at 42. 
Because it falls far short of the burden outlined in rule 24(a)(9) and leaves to the 
State and the Court the burden of interpreting and researching the claim, it should 
be disregarded. See Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, f 23, n.9,48 P.3d 918 ("A 
single, vague sentence without citation to the record or legal authority is 
inadequate" to properly brief the issue for appeal); State v. Smith, 2010 UT App 231, 
f^ 3, 238 P.3d 1103 (declining to address an inadequately briefed issue). 
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The remainder of Defendant's challenge lacks merit. The court's order sought 
appropriate information in light of Defendant's intent to assert mental health 
defenses. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(1)(a). The mere fact that the court solicited 
such information does not render it admissible in court. It simply sought to 
establish the availability of the mental health defense proposed by Defendant. It 
did not attempt, by its order, to assess the admissibility of that information under 
rule 704 or to alter the burden of proving Defendant's guilt at trial. In fact, the judge 
found it unnecessary to address the admissibility of the information prior to trial 
inasmuch as the State announced that it would not call either evaluator to testify in 
its case-in-chief. R. 2467/10. Instead, the judge explained that the matter would be 
addressed only if the need to do so arose at trial. Id. Defendant makes no reference 
to the trial testimony and no claim that any of the allegedly inadmissible 
information was offered or admitted at trial. See Aplt. Br. at 41-42. Accordingly, his 
challenge to the pre-trial order fails to present any error warranting relief. See Utah 
R. Crim. P. 30. 
V. 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMED BRADY VIOLATION FAILS ABSENT 
PROOF THE EVIDENCE WAS EXCULPATORY 
Defendant contends that the trial court violated his due process rights when it 
denied his motion for access to a computer disc that held photographs of the crime 
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scene. See Aplt. Br. at 42-44. He argues that the disc "contains evidence in digital 
form that is exculpatoryf,]" and the State's failure to relinquish it violated his due 
process rights under Brady v. Maiyland, 373 U.S. 83,83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). Aplt. Br. at 
43. No review of this claim is warranted, however. 
A Brady violation occurs only upon proof that 
The State suppressed information that (1) remained unknown to the 
defense both before and throughout trial and (2) was material and 
exculpatory, meaning its disclosure would have created a 'reasonable 
probability' that 'the result of the proceeding would have been 
different/ 
State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99,"f 33, 37 P.3d 1073 (citation omitted); see also State v. 
Hamblin, 2010 UT App 239, If 14,239 P.3d 300. 
Defendant fails both requirements. First, he filed a motion requesting the disc 
on December 28, 2007—three months before trial. 
Second, he offers no evidence that the disc contains any "material" or 
"exculpatory" information. "Evidence is constitutionally material if there is a 
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different 
1
 defendant's final sentence includes a claim that the State's failure to provide 
the information "constitutes prosecutorial misconduct." Aplt. Br. at 44. This 
gratuitous mention of a new issue, devoid of any legal authority or analysis, fails to 
meet the minimum briefing requirements, and the State does not address it further. 
See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); see State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, f 23,101 P.3d 387 (refusing to 
reach conclusory and inadequately briefed claim). 
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had the evidence been disclosed to the defense." State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, % 31, 
979 P.2d 799 (quotations and citation omitted). Defendant claims that the 
exculpatory evidence consists of some sort of digital evidence that the photographs 
were taken on different days. See Aplt. Br. at 43. However, he identifies no 
evidence suggesting that such information exists digitally, let alone that it exists on 
this disc. Hence, his claim that the State withheld material exculpatory evidence "is 
so speculative that it is impossible to see how it could have affected the outcome of 
the trial." State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785, 788 (Utah 1984). 
VI. 
DEFENDANTS CHALLENGE TO EXCLUSION OF DEFENSE 
EXHIBITS 2 AND 8 FAILS DUE TO INADEQUATE BRIEFING 
Defenda$t claims that the trial court erred in refusing to admit at trial defense 
exhibits 2 and 8. See Aplt. Br. at 44-46. Exhibit 2 is a police report written by Officer 
Ray Edwards that relates in some unidentified way to "events that occurred at the 
time of arrest[.]" Id. at 44-45 (capitalization omitted); R. 2977:43, 47; 2980:54-56. 
Exhibit 8 is a state crime lab report showing that there was no blood found on the 
knife that was located at the crime scene. R. 2977:44. Because Defendant's 
arguments as to both exhibits fail to meet minimum briefing requirements, this 
Court need not address them. See Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, f 15. 
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"An adequate brief is one that fully identifies and analyzes the issues with 
citation to relevant legal authority/' State v. lee, 2006 UT 5, \ 22,128 P.3d 1179 
(citing State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, f 11, 108 P.3d 710). "Mere 'bald citation to 
authority/ devoid of any analysis, is not adequate." Id. (quoting State v. Jaeger, 1999 
UT 1, f 31, 973 R2d 404) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Defendant argues that the police report, Exhibit 2, was admissible under rule 
803(8), Utah Rules of Evidence, simply because it was a police report and was 
"'offered by the defendant in a criminal case to support his defense/" Aplt. Br. at 45 
(quoting State v, Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181,1184-85 (Utah 1983)). However, the authority 
on which he relies requires that a proper foundation be laid before the report will be 
admitted. See Bertul; 664 P.2d at 1184/ Utah R. Evid. 803(8) (providing for 
admissibility "unless the resources of information or other circumstances indicate 
lack of trust worthiness."). Judge Laycock excluded the report based, in part, on a 
. lack of foundation. R. 2977:55. Yet Defendant makes no effort to address the 
foundation requirement. He fails even to provide this Court with the information 
necessary for it to conduct an appropriate analysis. Instead, he simply states; "By 
its markings (and the fact it was given to Defendant as part of discovery), Exhibit #2 
was admissible." See Aplt. Br. at 45. This argument lacks meaningful analysis of 
the specific facts of this case and should be summarily rejected. 
48 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendant also argues that the crime lab report, Exhibit 8, was admissible 
under an exception to the hearsay rule. See id. at 45-46. This argument likewise 
lacks any meaningful legal analysis. Defendant fails to identify the applicable 
hearsay exception, presents no mention of foundation, summarily provides that the 
document is "authenticated under Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 901[,]" and states, 
without further elaboration, that the sole relevance of the document depended on its 
presentation with evidence he admits he did not have at trial and whose absence he 
does not challenge on appeal. See id. 
Because Defendant's arguments are conclusory and lack meaningful analysis, 
review is not warranted. See Lee, 2006 UT 5, \ 23 (refusing to review conclusory 
argument lacking legal analysis). 
VII. 
DEFEND ANTS CHALLENGE TO EXCLUSION OF DEFENSE 
EXHIBITS 28 AND 29 FAILS FOR INADEQUATE BRIEFING 
Defendant's first pro se claim of error challenges Judge Lay cock's exclusion 
from trial of two proposed defense exhibits offered on the third day of trial: 1) a 
certified copy of the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered in federal 
district court more than two years prior to the instant case, finding Defendant to be 
incompetent (Defendant's Exhibit 28); and (2) Judge Laycock's memorandum 
decision of May 7, 2007, discussing the findings of three doctors who examined 
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Defendant for purposes of competency to proceed to trial (Defendant's Exhibit 29). 
See Aplt. Br. at Dl-2; R. 2980:39-45. Defendant summarily argues that the exhibits 
establish that he suffers from a mental illness and constituted "lawfully appropriate 
evidence" that should have been admitted in support of his defense. See id. at D2. 
Defendant's failure to provide any support for his position or to provide 
analysis in terms of his ability to form the requisite mental state for the charged 
crimes, however, defeats review of his claim. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Lee, 2006 
UT 5,11 22"23; Smith, 2010 UT App 231,13 (adequate briefing includes citation to 
authority, development of that authority, and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority). 
Moreover, he ignores the trial court's reasons for excluding the evidence: lack 
of foundation, irrelevance, and inadmissible hearsay. R. 2862/12; R. 2980:43-45. He 
simply contends that the court was required to take judicial notice of the exhibits 
and assumes that they then become admissible. See Aplt. Br. at 1-2. His argument 
lacks sufficient authority or analysis to permit appellate review of his claim. See 
Smith, 2010 UT App 231,1 3. 
VIII. 
DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR IN THE TRIAL COURTS 
FAILURE TO PROVIDE A JURY INSTRUCTION DEFINING 
"ATTEMPT" 
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Defendant claims that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the 
definition of "attempt." See Aplt. Br. at D2-7. He argues that "attempt" was an 
element of each of the charged offenses, that he submitted a proposed instruction, 
and that the absence of the instruction requires reversal of his convictions.16 See id. 
at D3-5. However, Defendant is not entitled to appellate review of the matter 
because, even assuming any error in the absence of the instruction, he invited it. 
The invited error doctrine prevents a defendant from attempting to obtain a 
reversal on appeal based on an error he helped to create in the trial court. See State 
v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106, f 11,236 P.3d 155; see also State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 
16, Tf 9,86 P.3d 742. "A defendant invites error where he 'affirmatively approve[s] 
of the jury instructions' at trial." State v. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, \ 26,153 P.3d 
Defendant claims that his "attempt" instruction was included in a pretrial 
"motion for proposed jury instructions[.]" See Aplt. Br. at D3. In fact, Defendant 
filed no such motion. He also contends that it was mailed to the court "along with" 
a Motion for Picture of the Holster and other documents. See id. In fact, Defendant's 
proposed instruction is not "with" but attached to a document entitled "Notice of 
Affirmative Defense of Compulsion" which he filed on December 7, 2007 — more 
than three months prior to his trial. R. 2347-10/10. Significantly, the instruction 
does not appear in the proposed instructions separately submitted by Defendant a 
month earlier. See R. 2956 (exhibit envelope), "Defendant's Proposed Jury 
Instructions." This explains the trial court's determination in ruling on Defendant's 
motion to arrest judgment that neither party submitted such an instruction to the 
court. R. 2862/12. 
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804 (quoting State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App 103, | 8,132 P.3d 703). Defendant did 
just that in this case, thereby waiving appellate review of his claim. 
The court provided both parties with a copy of the anticipated jury 
instructions by the end of the second day of trial. R. 2980:4. Judge Laycock met 
with the parties the next morning, and Defendant actively participated in review 
and discussion of the final jury instructions. R. 2980:4-27. He made no reference to 
his proposed instruction on "attempt7' during the discussion. Id. After discussing 
the need for any lesser included offense instruction, Judge Laycock stated, "Now, 
are we done talking about jury instructions then?" R. 2980:27-34. The prosecutor 
responded, "State is[,]" and Defendant said, "I am too, your Honor." Id. In so 
responding, Defendant informed the court that he had no objections to the 
remaining instructions. See Maese, 2010 UT App 106, \ 11. The conversation then 
shifted to a discussion of evidentiary issues. R. 2980:34. 
Because Defendant did not object and, in essence, actively approved of the 
jury instructions, he invited any error that exists in the court's failure to give his 
proposed instruction. Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to appellate review of 
this claim. See Maese, 2010 UT App 106, f 12. 
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IX, 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO ADEQUATELY BRIEF HIS 
CHALLENGES TO THE TRIAL COURTS DENIAL OF HIS 
MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to arrest 
judgment on one of two bases and that her failure to do so amounted to iper se error. 
See Aplt. Br. at D7-9. He claims first that the trial court was bound by vertical stare 
decisis to follow decisions from a higher court, and that Judge Laycock had no 
discretion to deny his motion where the facts were not in dispute and a strict rule of 
law applied. See id. at D7. He then contends in a single sentence devoid of citation 
to any authority that, regardless of why his "attempt" instruction was omitted, 
Judge Laycock had a "positive duty" to arrest judgment because of its absence. See 
id. This argument fails for inadequate briefing. See Peterson, 2002 UT 43, f 23, n.9. 
Defendant then claims that he was entitled to an arrest of judgment "as a 
matter of law" because the jail personnel interfered with his ability to select counsel, 
thereby depriving him of his right to counsel of his choice. See Aplt. Br. at D7-9. 
This claim fails because he fails to provide any authority or analysis supporting his 
perse claim. 
Specifically, he argues that the court was required to believe his accounts that 
jail personnel interfered with his mail, his calls, and his visits with counsel because 
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the State offered no evidence to contradict those claims. See id. at D8-9. Upon these 
facts, he claims, the court was required to find that his right to counsel of choice was 
violated and arrest judgment. See id. He offers no authority, however, establishing 
his assumption that the alleged interference could be redressed by the trial court in 
these criminal proceedings, that it amounted to a violation of his right to counsel of 
choice, or that his remedy is, as he claims, to have the judgment arrested. Where his 
argument contains numerous gaps and unsupported conclusions, it fails to reach 
"the threshold of argumentative completeness mandated by rule 24[,]" and this 
Court need not reach it. See Lee, 2006 UT 5, f 23. 
X. 
DEFENDANT'S CUMULATIVE ERROR ARGUMENT LACKS . 
MERIT 
Finally, Defendant contends that he is entitled to a new trial and a change of 
venue due to the cumulative error that occurred below. See Aplt. Br. at D9. 
'"A reviewing court will reverse a jury verdict under the cumulative error 
doctrine only if the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines . . . 
confidence that a fair trial was had/" State v. Gallegos, 2009 UT 42,139,220 P.3d 136 
(quoting State v. Killpack, 2008 UT 49, If 56, 191 P.3d 17 (omission in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted in Gallegos)). 
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Defendant has failed to establish any error below, let alone multiple errors. 
See Arguments, supra. To the extent this Court finds any errors exist, they do not 
undermine confidence that Defendant received a fair trial under the circumstances 
of this case. 
Viewing the proceedings in their full context, there is no doubt that Defendant 
received a fair trial. Consequently, his cumulative error claim is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted January 0 ,2011. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
4CRfs C. LEONARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Coun 
of Utah County. State of Utar 
_ ^ L ^ 5 ^ J f e y r - - Der""." 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ) 
AMADOR SANTONIO ) 
Defendant. 
) EX PARTE ORDER 
> Case No. 031402469 & 041402807 
1 Judge Lynn W. Davis 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This matter came before the court on August 14, 2006 for an evidentiary hearing on the report by 
Dr Juan Mejia to the court on the question of defendant's competency; L. Guy Probert 
represented the state. The court found that the evidentiary hearing was scheduled for 8:30am this 
day; the court heard from jail transportation that defendant claimed the evidentiary hearing was 
scheduled for 2:30 pm and that he refused to be transported for 8:30am; The court found that the 
evidentiary hearing had been scheduled in defendant's presence on August 7, 2006 for 8:30 am 
on August 14, 2006 and that there was nothing in the record to support defendant's claim that the 
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evidentiary hearing was scheduled for 2:30 pm and therefore that defendant had voluntarily 
absented himself from the proceedings. 
The court noted that Dr Juan Mejia was present, having been subpoenaed for the evidentiary 
hearing. 
The state, noting the defendant had previously refused to co-operate with one evaluator appointed 
pursuant to the court's order on granting the state's petition for an inquiry into defendant's 
competency, renewed its motion for the appointment of a fourth evaluator. The state argued that 
if the court struck Dr Mejia's report there would only be one report before the court. If the court 
did not strike Dr Mejia's report there would be two reports before the court but they would be in 
conflict as to whether defendant is competent, leaving the court with the difficult task of 
choosing between two experts when they are in disagreement. In either event it would be 
appropriate to have a farther evaluation. 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
a. That the defendant pay the costs of subpoena and attendance by Dr Juan Mejia for 
August 14, 2006; 
b. That a fourth evaluation of defendant's competency be conducted by the 
Department of Human Services; 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
c. That a scheduling conference is set for August 30,2006 at 1.0:00am 
Dated this 2/ day of August, 2006 
BY THE 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
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, j / r . i 3 c ^ £ Z l _ . Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) ORDER 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
) Case No. 031402469 & 041402S07 & 
AMADOR SANTONIO ) 
) Judge Claudia L. Laycock 
Defendant. ) 
This matter came Before the court on October 2,2006 for hearing on pro se motions of the 
defendant: 1. to amend or alter a judgment (which asked the court to vacate the appointment of 
another [fourth] evaluator, to re-set oral arguments on the motion to strike the report of Dr Mejia 
and vacate the order for costs of Dr Mejia against defendant with respect to the hearing on 
August 14,2006), 2. to strike the report of Dr Juan Mejia and 3. for a competency [mental] 
hearing. L. Guy Probert represented the state. Defendant appeared pro se. Having read the 
memoranda of the parties, having heard oral arguments on the motions supported by submission 
of an item of documentary evidence by defendant and after due consideration, the court made the 
1 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
following findings of fact and conclusions of law and made the following orders: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
As to defendant's motion to amend or alter judgment: 
A. As to the finding by Judge Davis that defendant voluntarily absented himself from the 
hearing on August 14, 2006: 
1. Defendant was present in court on August 7, 2006 at the time the evidentiary 
hearing with respect to the report submitted by Dr Juan Mejia was scheduled and 
no other hearing was set for him at that time; defendant was supplied with a copy 
of the court's minute entry; 
2. That such evidentiary hearing, as disclosed by the original of the court's minute 
entry, was in fact scheduled for 8:30am on August 14, 2006. 
3. That the copy of the court's minute entry for the appearance of defendant on 
August 7, 2006, provided to the defendant by the court and introduced by the 
defendant into evidence on hearing of his motion, discloses that the evidentiary 
hearing was in fact scheduled for 8:30am on August 14, 2006; 
4. That defendant was, by his own admission during these proceedings, requested by 
transportation officers at the Utah County Jail to come to court for the scheduled 
hearing; 
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5. That defendant made a decision not to attend when requested by transportation 
officers and therefore voluntarily absented himself from the evidentiary hearing 
and that to rule otherwise would be to open the door to jail inmates to decide 
when and if they will come to court. 
B. As to vacating the appointment of another [fourth] evaluator: 
1. While the title to Chapter 15 of Title 77 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, does state that the chapter relates to inquiry into the sanity of the 
defendant, the court is not concerned with the title to the chapter but with the 
substance of the chapter. 
2. §77-15-2 requires a 2-pronged approach to the determination of question whether 
a defendant is incompetent to proceed. 
3. There is no issue under the first prong (§77-15-2(1)). 
4. The second prong, as contained in §77-15-2(2), poses a very interesting issue in 
this case but it is an issue which should not be addressed at this time but in the 
U^^o^^^ c c " 
meatal hearing pursuant to §77-15-5(9) when that is held. 
5. The reports of Dr Wootton and Dr Panos relate to the question of defendant's 
competency or incompetency at a different day and time from the present and are 
not relevant to the consideration of this motion. 
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6. The statute at §77-15-5(2)(b) requires the court to appoint "at least two mental 
health experts" to examine the defendant. This wording confers on the court a 
limited discretion as to how many mental health experts it appoints in a particular 
case. The statute does not limit the court to appointment of two mental health 
experts and the court may, within its discretion, appoint more than two. 
7. The appointment, in the ex-parte order made August 14, 2006 and dated August 
21, 2006, of a fourth mental health expert to examine defendantf the context being 
that, of the three previously appointed in relation to the petition now before the 
court, one found defendant competent, one found him incompetent and defendant 
refused to co-operate with the third) was within the discretion of the court. It is 
also in accord with the long established practice of the court in circumstances 
such as those in this case and is allowed by statute. 
As to vacating the order that defendant pay Dr Mejia's costs 
1. The award of Dr Mejia's costs was properly made against the defendant for 
voluntarily absenting himself from the evidentiary hearing on August 14, 2006. 
2. The ex parte order made by Judge Davis at the evidentiary hearing on August 14, 
2006 and dated August 21, 2006, included an order that defendant pay the costs of 
Dr Juan Mejia's attendance at court on August 14, 2006 but the order signed by 
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the court did not include the amount of those costSj -wr ck^x ^ ^ JJ*O>V*W^ 
. ^ r p^ jv^-^r b ^ ^ 
D. As to resetting oral arguments on defendant's motion to strike the report of Dr Mejia 
1. This motion is made moot by these proceedings 
As to defendant's motion to strike the report of Dr Juan Mejia: 
A. Defendant seeks to apply to Dr Mejia's report the standard for admissibility of all expert 
testimony offered under Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence from Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals , Inc, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Utah is not however a 
Daubert state and considerations with respect to the admissibility of scientific evidence in 
Utah are controlled by the Utah Supreme Court decision in State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 
388 (Utah 1989) 
B. Moreover, Rimmasch only applies with novel theories and there are no novel theories 
here, so Rimmasch does not apply. 
C. That the court finds the MMPI, although disdained by defendant, is a helpful tool. 
D. Defendant seeks to challenge the substance, methods and results of Dr Mejia's report in 
his absence and to launch a preemptory strike against the report. 
IfviAiXZiiri^u QJL^ 
E. The time to evaluate the merits, or otherwise, of Dr Mejia's report is in the me»tel ^ 
hearing under §77-15-5(9) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
As to the proceedings before the court, generally 
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A. There being an inquiry into the competency of the defendant before the court, all other 
proceedings in the case are stayed. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. That the court sustains the order of Judge Lynn W. Davis made August 14, 2006 and 
dated August 21, 2006 and confirms the appointment of a fourth mental health expert to 
inquire into the competency of the defendant. 
2. That the fourth mental health expert may be Dr John Malouf who has already been 
appointed pursuant to the order made by Judge Davis and dated August 21, 2006 or 
whoever the Department of Human Services nominates for the purpose; 
3. That defendant co-operate with Dr Malouf or other mental health expert appointed by the 
Department of Human Services in his inquiry into defendant's competency; 
4. That counsel for the state file a memorandum of Dr Juan Mejia's costs associated with his 
attendance at the evidentiary hearing on August 14, 2006; 
5. That defendant's motion to alter or amend judgment: 
as to the appointment of another [fourth] evaluator, is denied; 
as to the re-setting of oral arguments on defendant's motion to strike the report of 
Dr Mejia, is moot; 
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as to vacation of the award of costs of Dr Mejia against the defendant, is denied 
6. That defendant's motion to strike the report ofDr Juan Mejia is denied; 
7. That defendant's motion for a competency hearing is premature and is therefore denied; 
8. That the matter be set for a review hearing on November 13, 2006 at 8:30am, to which 
defendant will be transported, for the purpose of determining whether defendant has co-
operated with the mental health expert and whether the report of the mental health expert 
is available, and if it is, to set a mental hearing within the time limited by statute. 
9. All other proceedings with respect to the case being stayed by the inquiry into defendant's 
competency, that the court will not entertain or rule on any other motions in the matter 
while the inquiry into defendant's competency is pending. 
Dated this I 3 ^ K day of Oetebei? 2006 
BY THE COURT 
JLUJLL^^ 
, ^ ' J ^ s s y a ^ 
Fourth Judicial District C©urt St y J* Li-
S£>&^*&' ^W 
Approved as to form and content 
Amador Santonio, Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I hand mailed or transmitted by facsimile transmission a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order this J*' Day of October, 
2006, for delivery to the following: 
To: 
Amador Santonio 
Utah County Jail 
3075 North Main Street, 
Spanish Fork, Ut 84660 
-egal'Secretary 
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1 when he's trying to stake out land in the desert that doesn't 
2 have any value. He goes out, he sits in his tent, and he makes 
3 up what he believes it should be; but he doesn't go out there 
4 and do it because well, it ain't worth it. In this case I 
5 think Dr. Mahea is lazy and he just didn't address it. 
6 As far as the issue of my coming to Court or not 
7 coming to Court on that day, I believe culpability says what 
8 was it in the defendant's point of view? Did he look at that 
9 and see a 2:30? Did he not address it to the guards at the 
10 jail? In fact, I was even locked down for two days because I 
11 kept bringing the issue up, thinking that I was supposed to 
12 appear in the afternoon. 
13 So I believe that if we look at it from culpability, 
14 I'm not culpable. I didn't do it knowingly or voluntarily. 
15 I addressed the issue as I addressed it the week before, 
16. believing that those efforts would result in my being taken 
17 to Court at the correct time. 
18 THE COURT: Thank you. Let me take the issues one at 
19 a time. In this motion the defendant wants me to vacate an 
2 0 order made by Judge Davis, in which Judge Davis found that the 
21 defendant had voluntarily refused to come to Court; and based 
22 on that, Judge Davis ordered him to pay the cost for the doctor 
23 who was brought to testify that day. 
24 As I look at this, it is possible to see that he might 
25 have assumed that it was a 2, but it also looks like an 8. The 
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bottom line for me is that the defendant, was present when this 
hearing was set. It's the only hearing he had to be at. He 
had officers that were telling him that he needed to come to 
Court, and he made his own decision that he would not go to 
Court. 
My assumption is that if the defendant is called down 
and is supposed to go to Court, he'll respond and he'll go, 
whether or not he thinks the officers may or may not be right. 
There are times that we have people come over unnecessarily. 
We call it "field trips." There are also times when we change 
hearings for one reason or the other, and because it happens at 
the last minute, we may call the jail — please sit down -- we 
may call the jail and alter the list, and tell them to bring 
someone. 
My assumption is that the defendants will obey and 
come when they are asked to come by the jail personnel. I 
think for me to rule otherwise is to open the door to jail 
inmates who decide when and if they will come to Court. 
(Coughing) excuse me. Apologize for my illness today. 
For those reasons, I will not vacate the order from 
Judge Davis. I note that the minute entry from that hearing 
said that he was ordering the defendant to pay the costs before 
any further hearings would be held in this matter. However, 
the actual signed order does not say that; and I will go with 
the actual signed order. 
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1 So my expectation is that Mr. Santonio will pay those 
2 costs, and I will order the State to provide the Court with a 
3 memorandum which outlines the costs that were incurred to pay 
4 for zhe Court at that time. 
5 MR. SANTONIO: Your Honor, can I get transcripts of 
6 today's hearing. 
7 THE COURT: Excuse me, I'm not done, and you need to 
8 be quiet. As to Dr. Mahea's report, in all honesty, the 
9 discussion that we've had today, in my opinion, is totally 
10 unnecessary. The defendant makes some interesting arguments 
11 about Federal law and the Daubert case. Some people refer to 
12 it as Daubert or Daubert, French, but apparently Mr. Daubert 
13 really said it Mr. Daubert. 
14 This is not a Daubert state. We do not follow the 
15 ,1 Federal lav; with regard to the Daubert case. We have a case 
16 called Ramosh; and what both Daubert and Ramosh deal with are 
17 not simple 702 -- Rule 702 issues. Ramosh deals with novel 
18 scientific rules, and we're not dealing with novel scientific 
19 theories here in this case. 
20 What the defendant attempts to do in his motion to 
21 strike Dr. Mahea's report is to essentially launch a peremptory 
22 strike. Without having Dr. Mahea here to defend his report, he 
23 wants the Court to go ahead and strike the report now without 
24 a full hearing. He's attacking the substance, the methods and 
25 the results. That's not appropriate for -- at this point in a 
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o-fiHDiSTRiCT 
?BSf OFUTAH UTAH COUNTY 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMADOR SANTONIO, 
Defendant. 
j SECOND AMENDED ORDER FOR 
EVALUATION, PURSUANT TO 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-16a-301 
Case No. 031402469 
Judge: Claudia Laycock 
Division 3 
Date: November 8,2007 
The defendant, Amador Santonio, appeared before this court on November 7,2007. 
Randy Kennard, Deputy Utah County Attorney, appeared on behalf of the State. The defendant 
intends to claim that (1) he is not guilty by reason of insanity, or that (2) he had diminished 
mental capacity, or that (3) he intends to assert special mitigation under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
205.5.1 
Pursuant to the court's earlier order, the court has now received reports from Drs. 
Wootton and Malouf. The court finds that Dr. Wootton's report does not consider the 
appropriate criteria, while Dr. Malouf s report is somewhat closer in its analysis. .The court now 
enters the following amended 
'Discussion was held between the court and the defendant as to the appropriateness of the 
defendant's claim under this statute. Defendant claims that he can lift subsection (b) out of this 
statute and apply it to this case. This court disagrees. Further discussion will undoubtedly occur 
at a later date. 
f\ rs ^ *•» 
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ORDER 
1. The court orders the experts, Drs. Wootton and Malouf, to answer the following 
question, in reference to Utah Code Ann. 76-2-305(l)(a): 
Did the defendant, at the time of the offense, suffer from a mental illness, 
as defined in UCA §76-2-305(4)(a), that prevented him from forming the intent 
to intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly commit the crimes with which he is 
charged? 
2. The court refers the experts to UCA §§76-2-101 through 76-2-103 for further 
information regarding and definitions of the terms intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly? 
3. The court also orders the experts to re-interview the defendant and re-evaluate the 
other materials provided in order, as needed, in order to properly address the issue before them. 
4. As the trial is now set for December 3, 4, and 6, 2007, the court requests that the 
experts move with haste and expediency, so that they may deliver their revised reports no later 
than November 23, 2007. 
5. All other relevant orders from the previous Amended Order remain effective. 
DATED this 8th day of November, 2007. 
BYTHI 
2With one exception, all of the crimes charged in this matter share the same intent: 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly. The exception is the crime of disarming a peace officer, 
which provides for only one possible intent: intentionally. 
o 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that a true copy of the foregoing ruling was mailed on 0 November 2007 to the 
following: 
Randy Kennard 
Utah County Attorney's Office 
(Hand-delivered) 
Amador Santonio 
Utah County Jail 
(Faxed and Mailed) 
/ / i SI I I / / 
<P^: 7)V^JM-OA^U - &«4. 
Deputy/Court Clerk 
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